Some NIS+ security tasks can be performed more easily with Solstice AdminSuite tools, if you have them available.
The credential/authentication system prevents someone from assuming some other user's identity. That is, it prevents someone with root privileges on one machine from using the su command to assume the identity of a second user who is either not logged in at all or logged in on another machine and then accessing NIS+ objects with the second user's NIS+ access privileges.
NIS+ cannot prevent someone who knows another user's login password from assuming that other user's identity and the other user's NIS+ access privileges. Nor can NIS+ prevent a user with root privileges from assuming the identity of another user who is currently logged in on the same machine.
See Chapter 6, Security Overview, for a description of how NIS+ credentials and authentication work with authorization and access rights to provide security for the NIS+ namespace.
To understand how DES credentials are created and how they work, you need to distinguish between the credential itself and the information that is used to create and verify it.
Credential information: The data that is used to generate a DES credential and by the server to verify that credential.
DES credential: The bundle of numbers that is sent by the principal to the server to authenticate the principal. A principal's credential is generated and verified each time the principal makes an NIS+ request. See "The DES Credential in Detail" for a detailed description of the DES credential.
In order for the credential/authentication process to work the following components must be in place:
Principal's DES credential information. This information is initially created by an NIS+ administrator for each principal. It is stored in the cred table of the principal's home domain. A principal's DES credential information consists of:
Principal name. This would be a user's fully qualified login ID or a machine's fully qualified host name.
Principal's Secure RPC netname. Each principal has a unique Secure RPC netname. (See "DES Credential Secure RPC Netname" for more information on Secure RPC netnames.)
Principal's public key.
Principal's encrypted private key.
Principal's LOCAL credential
Server's public keys. Each directory object stores copies of the public keys of all the servers in that domain. Note that each server's DES credentials are also stored in the cred table.
Keyserver copy of principal's private key. The keyserver has a copy of the private key of the principal that is currently logged in (user or machine).
There are three phases to the authorization process:
Preparation phase. This consists of the setup work performed by an NIS+ administrator prior to the user logging in; for example, creating credential information for the user.
Login phase. This consists of the actions taken by the system when a user logs in.
Request phase. This consists of the actions taken by the software when an NIS+ principal makes a request for an NIS+ service or access to an NIS+ object.
These three phases are described in detail in the following subsections.
The easiest way for an NIS+ administrator to create credential information for users is to use the nisclient script as described in Solaris Naming Setup and Configuration Guide. This section describes how to create client information using the NIS+ command set.
Prior to an NIS+ principal logging in, an NIS+ administrator must create DES credential information for that principal (user or machine). The administrator must:
Create a public key and an encrypted private key for each principal. These keys are stored in the principal's home domain cred table. This can be done with the nisaddcred command as described in "Creating Credential Information for NIS+ Principals".
Create server public keys. (See "Updating Public Keys".)
When a principal logs into the system the following steps are automatically performed:
When a principal's login password is different from his or her Secure RPC password, keylogin cannot decrypt it and the user starts getting "cannot decrypt" errors or the command fails without a message. For a discussion of this problem, see "Secure RPC Password Versus Login Password Problem".
The decrypted private key remains stored for use by the keyserver until the user does an explicit keylogout. If the user simply logs out (or goes home for the day without logging out), the decrypted private key remains stored in the server. If someone with root privileges on a user's machine switched to the user's login ID, that person would then have use of the user's decrypted private key and could access NIS+ objects using the user's access authorization. Thus, for added security, users should be cautioned to perform an explicit keylogout when they cease work. If they also log out of the system, all they need do is log back in when they return. If they do not explicitly log out, they will have to perform an explicit keylogin when they return to work.
Every time an NIS+ principal requests access to an NIS+ object, the NIS+ software performs a multistage process to authenticate that principal:
NIS+ checks the cred table of the object's domain. If:
The principal has LOCAL credential information, NIS+ uses the domain information contained in the LOCAL credential to find the principal's home domain cred table where it obtains the information it needs.
The principal has no credential information, the rest of the process is aborted and the principal is given the authorization access class of nobody.
NIS+ gets the user's DES credential from the cred table of the user's home domain. The encrypted private key is decrypted with the user's password and saved by the keyserver.
The common key is then used to generate an encrypted DES key. To do this, Secure RPC generates a random number which is then encrypted using the common key. For this reason, the DES key is sometimes referred to as the random key or the random DES key.
NIS+ then creates a 15-second window, which is encrypted with the DES key. This window is the maximum amount of time that is permitted between the time stamp and the server's internal clock.
NIS+ then passes the following information to the server where the NIS+ object is stored:
The access request (whatever it might be)
The principal's DES credential
Window verifier (encrypted), which is the encrypted window plus one
The object's server receives this information.
The object's server uses the Secure RPC netname portion of the credential to look up the principal's public key in the cred table of the principal's home domain.
The server then uses the principal's public key and the server's private key to regenerate the common key. This common key must match the common key that was generated by the principal's private key and the server's public key.
The common key is used to decrypt the DES key that arrived as part of the principal's credential.
The server decrypts the principal's time stamp with the newly decrypted DES key and verifies it with the window verifier.
If the time difference at the server exceeds the window limit, the request is denied and the process aborts with an error message. For example, suppose the time stamp is 9:00am and the window is one minute. If the request is received and decrypted by the server after 9:01am, it is denied.
If the time stamp is within the window limit, the server checks to see if the time stamp is greater than the one previously received from the principal. This ensures that NIS+ requests are handled in the correct order.
Requests received out of order are rejected with an error message. For example, if the time stamp is 9:00am and the most recently received request from this principal had a time stamp of 9:02am, the request would be rejected.
Requests that have a time stamp equal to the previous one are rejected with an error message. This ensures that a replayed request is not acted on twice. For example, if the time stamp is 9:00am and the most recently received request from this principal also had a time stamp of 9:00am, this request would be rejected.
If the time stamp is within the window limit, and greater than the previous request from that principal, the server accepts the request.
The server then complies with the request and stores the time stamp from this principal as the most recently received and acted on request.
To confirm to the principal that the information received from the server in answer to the request comes from a trusted server, the server encrypts the time stamp with the principal's DES key and sends it back to the principal along with the data.
At the principal's end, the returned time stamp is decrypted with the principal's DES key.
If the decryption succeeds, the information from the server is returned to the requester.
If the decryption fails for some reason, an error message is displayed.