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Privileges restrict processes are implemented in the kernel, and can restrict processes at the command, user, role, or system level.
Table 10-3 Commands for Handling Privilege
Table 10-4 Files That Contain Privilege Information
Privilege use can be audited. Any time that a process uses a privilege, the use of privilege is recorded in the audit trail in the upriv audit token. When privilege names are part of the record, their textual representation is used. The following audit events record use of privilege:
AUE_SETPPRIV audit event – The event generates an audit record when a privilege set is changed. The AUE_SETPPRIV audit event is in the pm class.
AUE_MODALLOCPRIV audit event – The audit event generates an audit record when a privilege is added from outside the kernel. The AUE_MODALLOCPRIV audit event is in the ad class.
AUE_MODDEVPLCY audit event – The audit event generates an audit record when the device policy is changed. The AUE_MODDEVPLCY audit event is in the ad class.
AUE_PFEXEC audit event – The audit event generates an audit record when a call is made to execve() with pfexec() enabled. The AUE_PFEXEC audit event is in the as,ex, ps, and ua audit classes. The names of the privileges are included in the audit record.
The successful use of privileges that are in the basic set is not audited. The attempt to use a basic privilege that has been removed from a user's basic set is audited.
The kernel prevents privilege escalation. Privilege escalation is when a privilege enables a process to do more than the process should be able to do. To prevent a process from gaining more privileges than the process should have, vulnerable system modifications require the full set of privileges. For example, a file or process that is owned by root (UID=0) can only be changed by a process with the full set of privileges. The root account does not require privileges to change a file that root owns. However, a non-root user must have all privileges in order to change a file that is owned by root.
Similarly, operations that provide access to devices require all privileges in the effective set.
The file_chown_self and proc_owner privileges are subject to privilege escalation. The file_chown_self privilege allows a process to give away its files. The proc_owner privilege allows a process to inspect processes that the process does not own.
The file_chown_self privilege is limited by the rstchown system variable. When the rstchown variable is set to zero, the file_chown_self privilege is removed from the initial inheritable set of the system and of all users. For more information about the rstchown system variable, see the chown(1) man page.
The file_chown_self privilege is most safely assigned to a particular command, placed in a profile, and assigned to a role for use in a profile shell.
The proc_owner privilege is not sufficient to switch a process UID to 0. To switch a process from any UID to UID=0 requires all privileges. Because the proc_owner privilege gives unrestricted read access to all files on the system, the privilege is most safely assigned to a particular command, placed in a profile, and assigned to a role for use in a profile shell.
Caution - A user's account can be modified to include the file_chown_self privilege or the proc_owner privilege in the user's initial inheritable set. You should have overriding security reasons for placing such powerful privileges in the inheritable set of privileges for any user, role, or system.
For details of how privilege escalation is prevented for devices, see Privileges and Devices.
To accommodate legacy applications, the implementation of privileges works with both the superuser and the privilege models. The kernel automatically tracks the PRIV_AWARE flag, which indicates that a program has been designed to work with privileges. Consider a child process that is not aware of privileges. Any privileges that were inherited from the parent process are available in the child's permitted and effective sets. If the child process sets a UID to 0, the child process might not have full superuser capabilities. The process's effective and permitted sets are restricted to those privileges in the child's limit set. Thus, the limit set of a privilege-aware process restricts the root privileges of child processes that are not aware of privileges.