Split tunneling allows a VPN client to connect to both secure sites and non-secure sites, without having to connect or disconnect the VPN—in this case, the Netlet—connection. The client determines whether to send the information over the encrypted path, or to send it by using the non-encrypted path. The concern over split tunneling is that you could have a direct connection from the non-secure Internet to your VPN-secured network, via the client. Turning off split tunneling (not allowing both connections simultaneously) reduces the vulnerability of the VPN (or in the case of Netlet) connection to Internet intrusion.
Though Portal Server does not prohibit nor shut down multiple network connections while attached to the portal site, it does prevent unauthorized users from “piggybacking” on other users’s sessions in the following ways:
Netlet is an application specific VPN and not a general purpose IP router. Netlet only forwards packets that have been defined by a Netlet rule. This differs from the standard VPN approach that gives you complete LAN access once you’ve connected to the network.
Only an authenticated portal user can run the Netlet. No portal application can be run until the user has been successfully authenticated, and no new connections can be made if an authenticated session does not exist.
All access controls in place on the application side are still in effect so that an attacker would also have to break in to the back-end application.
Every Netlet connection results in a dialog box posted by the Netlet (running in the authenticated user’s JVMTM implementation) to the authenticated user’s display. The dialog box asks for verification and acknowledgement to permit the new connection. For attackers to be able to utilize a Netlet connection, attackers would need to know that the Netlet was running, the port number it was listening on, how to break the back-end application, and convince the user to approve the connection.