StorageTek Crypto Key Management System
Version 2.x

Security and Authentication White Paper

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Crypto Key Management System, Security and Authentication White Paper

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Change History

Document Description		
Document Owner		Sandy Stewart –- Director of Engineering
Organization		Storage Engineering
Revision	**Date**	**Description**
Revision A	11/09/09	Initial release
Revision B	04/15/2010	Added Oracle branding

1. Audience

This documentation is intended for StorageTek employees, field personnel, partners, and customers who are interested in learning more about the Security and Authentication aspects of the StorageTek Key Management System (KMS 2.x.). Intended audiences are those who are already familiar with the information contained within the systems assurance and installation guide.

Related Publications

The following publications provide additional information about specific topics relating to the use and security of the Key Management System (KMS.)

Description	Link or Part Number
StorageTek T10000A Tape Drive FIPS 140-2 Security Policy	http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp1157.pdf
StorageTek T10000B Tape Drive FIPS 140-2 Security Policy	http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp1156.pdf
StorageTek T9840D Tape Drive FIPS 140-2 Security Policy	In Process
Sun Crypto Accelerator 6000 FIPS Security Policy	http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp1050.pdf
Crypto Key Management System: Systems Assurance Guide	http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/316194804B?l=en
Crypto Key Management System: Installation and Service Manual (Internal Only)	http://docs.sfbay.sun.com/app/docs/doc/316194904BB?l=en
Crypto Key Management System: Administration Guide	http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/316195102A?l=en
KMS 2.x Management Practices	http://docs.sfbay.sun.com/app/docs/doc/KMS20mgmt2?l=en
KMS 2.x: Tape Drive Encryption Solutions Best Practices	http://docs.sfbay.sun.com/app/docs/doc/KMS20Ficon3?l=en
KMS 2.x: Open Systems Implementation Practices	http://docs.sfbay.sun.com/app/docs/doc/KMS20Open4?l=en

2. Scope

This document provides an overview of the Security and Authentication aspects of the StorageTek Crypto Key Management System Version 2.x (KMS 2.x).

KMS 2.x describes the family name for the product, updates to the initial release will have appropriate Version numbers such as KMS 2.1. The Key Management System is architected to provide highly secure and automated key management services to generic encryption agents – initially to tape drives supported in Automation and Library products.

This document does not cover the details of Installation and operation of KMS 2.x since these are fully described in the documents listed in Section 4.

3. Overview

The StorageTek Crypto Key Management System Version 2.x (KMS 2.x) consists of:

- Key Management Appliance - a machine loaded with the Key Management Appliance (KMA) Software. One or more of these machines is required for KMS 2.x.
- Key Management System Cluster - the full set of KMAs in the system. All these KMAs are aware of each other, and replicate information to each other. When the KMS documentation refers to the "KMS Cluster", it means the common, collective information held by all KMAs in the cluster.
- Agent - A device or software that performs encryption, using keys managed by the KMS Cluster. For KMS 2.x, these are the StorageTek encrypting tape drives. Agents communicate with KMAs via the agent API. This a set of software interfaces that are incorporated into the agent hardware or software.
- KMS Manager - A software component that provides a management GUI. The KMS Manager incorporates the management API. It uses the management API to communicate with the KMAs in the KMS Cluster. The KMS Manager must be installed on a customer-provided platform running Windows or Solaris. In addition to the system components, there are the external “actors” that interact with the system. These are described below.

Note: The term “actors” covers both human and hardware/software modules that interact with KMS.



Actors

User

Users are persons who have a userid and passphrase to log into the KMS Cluster. Users can log in either through the KMA Console or using the KMS Manager GUI.

A user must be assigned one or more roles. Each role can perform a subset of the use cases described here. The roles are:

Security Officer

The security officer role allows management of the KMS Cluster's security settings, users, sites and transfer partners.

Compliance Officer

The compliance officer role manages key policies and key groups and determines which agents and transfer partners can use which key groups.

Operator

The operator role manages agents, data units and keys.

Backup Operator

The backup operator role performs backups.

Auditor

The auditor role can view information about the KMS Cluster.

Agent

Strictly speaking, the agent is considered part of the system. For the encryption agent use cases, however, it is useful to consider the agent as an actor acting on the KMS Cluster.

NTP Server

This is a server outside the system which uses NTP protocol to control the system time. Configured with the time use cases.

Technical Support

Technical Support is a qualified service person (QSP) who can connect directly into a KMA using ssh.

SNMP Manager

SNMP Managers may be configured as INFORM destinations for the KMS Cluster.

Agent Operator

The Agent Operator is a person or software that can interact with an agent to complete the encryption agent use cases.

4. Authentication

The KMS architecture provides for mutual authentication between all elements of the system: KMA to KMA, drive to KMA and the KMS Manager GUI to KMA for user operations.

In simple terms, enrollment of each element of the system (for example a new encryption agent) is accomplished by creating an ID and a passphrase in the KMS that is then entered into the element to be added. For example, when a new drive (encryption agent) is added to the system, the agent and KMA automatically run a challenge/response protocol based on the shared passphrase that results in the agent obtaining the Root CA certificate and a new key pair and signed certificate for the agent. With the Root CA, agent certificate, and key pair in place, the agent can run the TLS mutual authentication mode protocol for all subsequent communications.

Each time a KMA boots up, it acts as a root certificate authority (CA) to generate a root certificate that is used in turn to derive the certificates used by Agents as well as a user certificate that the KMA uses to authenticate its side of subsequent communications.

Generation of Agent Certificates:

- The Issuer Common Name (CN) is always set to 'RootCA'
- The KMA generates a Serial Number based on a concatenation of the 64-bit KMA ID and 64-bit sequential counter from the KMS DB.
- The Subject Common Name is the text name given to the Agent. In the following example, the certificate is issued to 'MyAgent'
- The agent stores this certificate, along with the corresponding private key, in a file called "clientkey.pem"

KMS does not support external Certificate Authorities.

Specific Enrollment Procedures

Agent to KMS

When a new drive (agent) is enrolled in KMS, the user in the role of Operator uses the GUI to enter the following parameters:

- Agent ID – a value that uniquely defines the Agent, between 1 to 64 characters
- Agent Description (optional) - a value that describes the Agent, between 1 to 64 characters
- Site ID (optional) – a click-down entry that defines the site location of the agent
- Passphrase (enter and confirm) – the KMS ensures that the selected passphrase meets the requirements for passphrase strength
- Minimum value 8 characters, maximum value 64 characters
- Must contain 3 of the four character classes: upper case, lower case, numeric or special characters
- The following special characters are allowed:

  ~ ! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) - _ = + [{ }] ; : ' “ , . / ?
- Control characters including tabs and linefeeds are not allowed

The Agent ID and Passphrase must then be entered into the new drive using the StorageTek Virtual Operator Panel (VOP) tool along with the IP address of an addressable KMA.

Adding a New KMA to an Existing Cluster

When a Key Management Appliance is added to an existing cluster, additional safeguards are in place due to the sensitivity of this operation.

The user in the role of Security Officer uses the GUI to first create a KMA and then subsequently uses the QuickStart program to Initialize the KMA and then join it to an existing cluster.

Initial authentication of the new KMA is accomplished by the challenge/response between the new KMA and an existing KMA in the cluster based on the secret passphrase shared as described below.

Create a KMA

The KMA platform will have already been assigned an IP address and the Security Officer will assign parameters to the KMA as follows

- KMA Name – a value that uniquely defines the KMA, between 1 to 64 characters
- KMA Description (optional) - a value that uniquely describes the KMA, between 1 to 64 characters
- Site ID (optional) – a click-down entry that defines the site location of the KMA
- Passphrase (enter and confirm) – the KMS ensures that the selected passphrase meets the requirements for passphrase strength

Initialize the KMA Using the QuickStart Program

- The Security officer will enter the KMA name that must match the value provided above
- See the Administration Guide for details of this process and other parameters that must be entered

Join the KMA to an Existing Cluster Using the QuickStart Program

- The Security Officer will select Join Existing Cluster
- Enters the IP Address or Host Name of an existing KMA in the cluster
- Enters the Passphrase for the new KMA assigned above
- At this point, a screen is presented for the requisite number of Quorum Members to to enter their credentials (see description later)
- On completion, the new KMA is now known to the cluster but is in a Locked Condition, communicating with other KMAs but is locked and not available to interact with Encryption Agents. The KMS Manager GUI is used to unlock the new KMA and complete the process
- The data and time on the new KMA set to the date and time from the specified existing KMA.
- The KMS Cluster will begin propagating all information to the newly added KMA. This will cause the new KMA to be very busy until it is caught up with the existing KMAs. Existing KMAs will also be busy.
- Once the replication lag for the new KMA drops to a similar value to other KMAs in the cluster, the KMA should be manually unlocked. Thew Unlock operation is initiated by a Security Officer and validated by the Quorum.

User to KMS

The KMS Manager GUI runs on a customer-supplied platform and users log in to the KMS cluster with a User ID and Passphrase created by a Security Officer and shared individually with the User.

To create a new user, an existing user with a Security Officer role uses the GUI to enter the following parameters:

- User ID – a value that uniquely defines the User, between 1 to 64 characters
- Description - a value that describes the User, between 1 to 64 characters
- Role: check boxes allow the selection of one or more pre-defined roles: Security Officer, Backup Operator, Compliance Officer, Operator.
- Passphrase (enter and confirm) – the KMS ensures that the selected passphrase meets the requirements for passphrase strength

When a User with defined credentials uses the GUI to log into the KMS, he or she enters the assigned ID and Passphrase which the KMS uses to conduct a challenge/response protocol based on this input and the user credentials stored in the KMS database. A successful challenge/response interaction results in the KMA sending a certificate to the system running the GUI to authenticate the specific Session connectivity.

5. Role of the SCA6000 Card

The fundamental security of the KMS 2.x Key Management Appliance is assured by the FIPS 140-2 Security Level 3 SCA 6000 Crypto-accelerator Card (Certificate 1050) with the crypto-boundary defined as the connector to the SCA6000. When the KMS is operated in FIPS compliant mode, keys do not leave the crypto-boundary of the SCA 6000 card in unwrapped form.

Given the constraints of using a standard server platform with its limitations on providing physical security, it was decided that little advantage would be obtained by pursuing FIPS 140-2 validation for the KMA based on a crypto-boundary defined as the external covers of the server. KMS 2.1 was released with the necessary features required for FIPS 140-2 certification for the encryption agents supported by KMS.

The SCA 6000 card is called by the Solaris Crypto Framework to provide all cryptographic functionality within the KMS. The SCA 6000 card uses the FIPS-approved RNG specified in FIPS 186-2 DSA RNG using SHA-1 for generation of cryptographic keys. A non-approved hardware RNG is used for providing seeding material.

- KMS versions 2.0 and 2.0.2 allowed the Solaris KMF to fail over to Software cryptography if the SCA6000 card was non-functional for any reason.
- KMS Version 2.1, which provided support for the FIPS 140-2 validated versions of the tape drives, does not allow this fail-over and thus introduced a single point of failure in the KMA.
- KMS Version 2.2 and future versions will allow the KMS to be set in a non-FIPS mode. This mode will allow fail-over in the event of SCA 6000 failure with appropriate status being set in the Management GUI indicating that such a fail-over has occurred. Fail-over is not allowed when the KMS is set in the FIPS mode.

6. Key Transmission



- Keys are transmitted from the KMA to encryption agents within the TLS channel and in wrapped form.
- Keys are generated and managed in KMA within SCA 6000 FIPS cryptographic boundary
- Keys are transported to the cryptographic boundary of the encrypting device (agent) on demand

Encryption key wrapping key transport

1. Agent initiates by requesting public key from KMA
2. RSA key pair $\mathbf{R_{pub}}$, $\mathbf{R_{priv}}$ generated in SCA 6000 by KMA
3. $\mathbf{R_{pub}}$ exported from SCA and sent to Agent by KMA
4. Agent generates and stores AES key, **W**, to be used as wrapping key for encryption keys
5. $\mathbf{\{W\}R_{pub}}$ (RSA PKCS #1 V1.5) returned to KMA and stored associated with particular Agent

Encryption key transport

1. Agent initiates by requesting tape drive encryption key
2. KMA generates the AES encryption key **E** (used to encrypt user data) in SCA 6000
3. KMA loads $\mathbf{\{W\}R_{pub}}$ into SCA 6000 and unwraps **W** with $\mathbf{R_{priv}}$
4. **E** is wrapped with **W** in the SCA 6000 and **{E}W** is sent to the agent
5. **E** is unwrapped with **W** in the agent

Notes:

- For KMS 2.0 and 2.0.2, wrapping of keys transmitted to the agent was provided by AES-256 CBC with HMAC Authentication
- For KMS 2.1 and future versions additionally support AES Keywrap to meet the latest NIST requirements and AES Keywrap is used in the FIPS 140-2 validated version of the drives.

7. KMS Replication

Each KMA in the cluster contains a replicated version of the entire KMS Database. Replication is a real-time process, transparent to the user.

The replication procedure for each KMA is executed when each Appliance starts. This procedure ensures that all peers have the Appliance's last-known timestamp vector and that the Appliance has a matrix of its peers' last-known timestamp vectors. The Appliance may also discover some new cluster members that it was previously unaware of.

Appliances exchange their peers' last-known timestamp vectors on a request received from a peer Appliance. The Appliance updates its knowledge of the peer's state, returns its timestamp state to the peer, helps the peer discover any cluster members the peer is unaware of, and initiates a pull of any non-replicated peer updates.

Updates are integrated into the local KMA transaction processing sequence. It ensures that unique timestamps are assigned to new or updated records and that the replication log is updated. After the transaction is committed, a push procedure is triggered to immediately propagate the updates to peer Appliances.

A "pull" anti-entropy replication strategy ensures that all updates eventually propagate to all servers, even in the case of failures. In this strategy, each Appliance triggers this procedure at 60-second intervals to pull updates from a randomly selected peer. When a KMA receives such a *PullReplication* message, it triggers a procedure that will send the requesting peer any local updates with timestamps less than the last-known timestamps in the peer's

Replication traffic is conducted over a TLS 1.0 channel with protection afforded by SSL.Version 3.0.

8. Master Key Functionality

When a new KMS cluster is created, an AES-256 Master Key is automatically generated. This Master Key is then split into shares using the Shamir Shared Secret Algorithm.

During the setup operation, a Quorum is defined with each member of the Quorum having an individual ID and passphrase. The passphrases are then used are used to create keys that encrypt the shares created by the Shamir Shared Secret Algorithm. Neither the actual values for the passphrases nor the Master Key Value itself are stored in the system but the passphrases when entered by the Quorum unwrap the encrypted shares and regenerate the Master Key.

It should be noted that the Master Key has two components, the Master Wrapping Key (MWK) and the Master Authentication Key (MAK) but for brevity, we will refer only to the MWK.

At the same time, an AES-256 Key Wrapping Key (KWK) and Key Authentication Key are created, along with a RSA 2048 private/public Key Pair, the Backup Public/Private keys.

This set of keys (KWK, BprivateK) only change if the Quorum is changed and are stored, wrapped by the MWK as the Core Security Backup.



Creating the Core Security Backup is a mandatory function when a new KMS cluster is created and is performed by a Security Officer who specifies the location and name for the file.

9. KMS Backup

Backup of the KMS database is a function executed from the KMS Manager GUI by a user in the role of Backup operator.

The Backup Operator is prompted to provide a file name (including location) for the Backup File itself and a separate file the Backup Key File. These files can be stored in any location accessible to the platform on which the GUI is being run.

Each time a Backup is created, an additional pair of AES-256 keys are created, Backup Wrapping Key (BWK) and Backup Authentication Key (BAK,) and stored as the Backup Key File, encrypted with the Backup Public Key in the location specified by the Backup Operator.

The KMS database is then encrypted by the KMA the Backup Operator is logged into using two layers of encryption (first the KWK/KAK and then the BWK/BAK) and stored in the specified location.

This provides highly robust security for the Key Database and allows it to be stored in an otherwise unprotected location.



10. **Restore KMS Database**

The act of restoring the KMS database is performed by a User in the Security Officer role using the KMS Manager GUI. The Security Officer must browse for and enter the location of the three files involved (Core Security Backup, Key File Backup and Key Backup.)

The Quorum screen will then be displayed and the requisite number of Quorum members enter their ID and passphrase.

- The passphrase is used to generate the key and unwrap part of the shared secret Master Key
- The shares combine to recreate the master key (MWK/MAK)
- The master key unwraps the BprivateK and the Key Wrapping Key (KWK, KAK)
- The BprivateK unwraps the Backup Wrapping Key (BWK, BAK)
- The Backup Wrapping Key unwraps the Key Package encrypted with the Key Wrapping Key
- Finally the Key Wrapping Key unwraps the encrypted database and allows it to be downloaded into the KMA.

Note: As part of the Restore Operation, the pre-existing database for the entire KMS is reset and overwritten.

11. Key Transfers

Keys can be transferred from one KMS cluster to another using the Key Transfer Process. This is a two stage process. The Transfer Relationship must be established in advance and is set up by users in the Security Officer Role at each party. Each party must create a Public/Private Key pair and transmit the value of the Public Key to the other. Using the GUI, the Security Officer must then enter the following information:

- Transfer Partner ID
- Transfer Partner Description
- Contact Information – this field describes how keys are to be transmitted to the partner – for example by email or by exchange of physical media
- Enabled – if the box is checked, the transfer partner can share keys with another partner.
- Allow Export To – if checked, this allows keys to be sent to the partner
- Allow Import From – if checked, this allows keys to be imported from the partner.

The next GUI Tab allows the Security Officer to enter the public key data received from the partner.

- New Public Key ID
- New Public Key Value
- New Public Key Fingerprint – this shows a hash value created from the Public Key value and allows verification that the key value has not been tampered with during transmission.

When the required information has been input, the GUI will prompt for a quorum to validate the operation.

Note that the Transfer Partner Relationship can be bi-directional or uni-directional depending on the Export/Import options selected.

When the Transfer Partnership set-up is complete, users in the Operator Role conduct the actual transfer of Keys. Keys are selected using the GUI typically based on VOLSER information and all keys that are “In Use” on the tape defined by that VOLSER can be selected for Export from the Data Unit List Menu. The Operator selected the transfer partner from the list and a file is created with the required keys encrypted using the Public Key received from the Transfer Partner and signed with the Private Key form the “home” KMA. The file is then transmitted by whichever means selected.

An Operator at the receiving partner then accesses the Import Keys function in the Transfer Partner menu, selects the Transfer Partner and Key Transfer File Name and defines the Key Group into which the Keys should be imported. The Key Transfer Partner file is then decrypted using the receiving partner's Private Key and validated using the transmitting partner's Public Key.

12. Autonomous Unlock

The KMS offers the option of Autonomous Unlock for each KMA. If Autonomous Unlock is selected, the KMA will automatically unlock the KMS database and be ready for operation without any further User intervention. With this option selected, simple computer forensic techniques allow an attacker to access keys with no cryptographic attack required.

If Autonomous Unlock is disabled, when the KMA is power-up, Quorum intervention is required for the KMA to become operational and be capable of providing keys. Until the Quorum requirements are satisfied, all keys in the KMA are fully protected and a cryptographic attack capable of breaking AES-256 is needed to access keys.

Toggling between Enabled/Disabled for Autonomous Unlock is a Security Officer function. Changing the state from Enabled to disabled must be validated by the Quorum.

A KMA in the locked state is not able to unwrap the Master Key Material and thus is unable to access Data Unit Keys. As a result, the KMA is unable to service Agent requests to register new Data Units or to retrieve Data Unit Keys for existing Data Units.

It should be noted that certain functions can still be performed on a Locked KMA such as creating a Backup since the Backup File and the Backup Key File are both cryptographically protected.

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