Oracle® Linux

Managing Certificates and Public Key Infrastructure
Abstract

Oracle® Linux: Managing Certificates and Public Key Infrastructure describes features in Oracle Linux for public key cryptography.

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Preface

*Oracle® Linux: Managing Certificates and Public Key Infrastructure* describes features in Oracle Linux to manage certificates and public key infrastructure.

**Audience**

This document is intended for administrators who need to configure and administer Oracle Linux features. It is assumed that readers are familiar with web technologies and have a general understanding of using the Linux operating system, including knowledge of how to use a text editor such as *emacs* or *vim*, essential commands such as *cd, chmod, chown, ls, mkdir, mv, ps, pwd, and rm*, and using the *man* command to view manual pages.

**Related Documents**

The documentation for this product is available at:


**Conventions**

The following text conventions are used in this document:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>boldface</strong></td>
<td>Boldface type indicates graphical user interface elements associated with an action, or terms defined in text or the glossary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>italic</em></td>
<td>Italic type indicates book titles, emphasis, or placeholder variables for which you supply particular values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>monospace</strong></td>
<td>Monospace type indicates commands within a paragraph, URLs, code in examples, text that appears on the screen, or text that you enter.</td>
</tr>
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Chapter 1 About Public Key Infrastructure

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This chapter provides a brief overview of the public key cryptography and how it works, including information about the public key infrastructure, which is used to facilitate the general management of keys on Oracle Linux.

1.1 What is Public Key Cryptography?

Public key cryptography is an encryption technique that is used to enable secure communications on an insecure public network and also to verify the identity of the entity on the other end of a network connection. Public key cryptography works by establishing an asymmetric pair keys. Data encrypted by one key is decrypted by the other key. One key is kept private and the other key is made public. Someone decrypting the data using the public key can be sure that the data was encrypted by someone who has access to the private key. Similarly, someone encrypting data using the public key can be sure that the data can only be decrypted by someone who has access to the private key.

Neither key on its own is capable of establishing the identity of the sender of the data. To achieve this, the public key is usually 'signed' as belonging to the owner of the private key. The signing process is typical done by a trusted third party, known as a Certification Authority (CA). To do this, the creator of the private and public key pair, sends the public key to the CA in the form of a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). The CA uses its own private key to sign a certificate, which contains an encrypted version of the originator's public key, along with other information about the entity (subject), the CA (issuer), the period of validity of the certificate, and the cryptographic algorithms used. This certificate can be made public or provided to any client that may need to decrypt data that has been encrypted using the private key.

Clients that trust the CA can also trust the public key stored in the certificate. Decrypting the certificate with the CA certificate yields the public key that can be then be used to create a secure communication channel that keeps the data confidential and which can be used to establish the identity of the originator of data moving through the channel.

For the Internet, there are many public top-level or root CAs, as well as many intermediary CAs that are trusted by a root CA to issue certificates on behalf of entities. An intermediary CA usually returns a certificate chain, where each certificate in the chain authenticates the public key of the signer of the previous certificate in the chain, up to and including a root CA.

CA certificates are only used to establish the identity of a public key and the period for which the public key should be considered valid. When the certificate expires, data encrypted using the public key can still be decrypted by the private key. This means that the private key must be kept safe forever, for your communications to always be considered secure. A mechanism also exists within public key cryptography that can be used to help mitigate against private key compromises. This mechanism is known as Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and uses a key exchange algorithm to securely agree on a random and disposable session key that can be used with a symmetric cipher to encrypt data. The advantage of this approach is that if the session key is compromised, only the communications in that particular communication session are exposed. Equally, if the private key is compromised, all of the actual communication sessions are not automatically exposed either.

Another added benefit of PFS is that it simplifies the computationally expensive and slow process of decrypting and validating each piece of information using the asymmetric key pair and the CA certificate. In
reality, the process of decrypting the public key and validating it against the CA certificate and then using it to decrypt data within a communication session is usually only done at the beginning of the session, until PFS is established. The algorithm to create and share the random session key is usually the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The session key then uses a symmetric cipher to perform more rapid encryption and decryption of data through the rest of the session. The cipher most commonly used for this purpose is AES, which can take advantage of hardware assistance to make encryption and communication in ciphertext almost as fast as communicating with plaintext.

The handling of the communication channel, and this negotiation where the client and server side switch from asymmetric to symmetric cryptography is all achieved using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) cryptographic protocols.

OpenSSL provides an open-source implementation of the TLS and SSL protocols. If a hierarchy of trust is confined to your organization's intranet, you can use OpenSSL to generate a root certificate and set up a CA for that domain. However, unless you install this self-signed root certificate on each system in your organization, browsers, LDAP or IPA authentication, and other software that use certificates will prompt the user about the potentially untrusted relationship.

**Note**

If you do use certificates for your domain that are validated by a root or intermediary-level CA, you do not need to distribute a root certificate, as the appropriate certificate should already be present on each system.

Typically, TLS/SSL certificates expire after one year. Other certificates, including root certificates that are distributed with web browsers and which are issued by root and intermediary CAs, usually expire after a period of five to 10 years. To avoid having applications display warnings about out-of-date certificates, you should plan to replace TLS/SSL certificates before they expire. For root certificates, it is usually not a problem, as you would typically update the software prior to the certificate expiring.

If you request a signed certificate from a CA for which a root certificate or certificate chain that authenticates the CA's public key does not already exist on your system, obtain a trusted root certificate from the CA. To avoid a potential man-in-the-middle attack, verify the authenticity of the root certificate before importing it. Check that the certificate's fingerprint matches the fingerprint that is published by the CA.

### 1.2 Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME)

Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) is a protocol and framework that is published by the IETF in RFC 8555 and which can be used to facilitate the signing and creation of certificates where domain validation is required.

The protocol uses JSON formatted messages over HTTPS with a CA to handle validation of domain ownership automatically by having the ACME client perform an action that can only be done with control of the domain name. For example, the CA could either request the provision of a DNS record, or could request a specific HTTP resource to be made available on a web server at the domain name.

Once the CA is able to validate that the entity requesting a certificate has ownership of the domain, the CA can sign the certificate that is sent to it by the ACME client. Usually, the client can automatically install the certificate at a location that is usable by services running on the system.

ACME lowers the cost and complexity associated with managing public key infrastructure. In some cases, obtaining signed certificates for systems within your domains can be free, depending on your selection of CA. For example, Let's Encrypt, the originator of the ACME protocol, provides a free and open CA service. Other commercial CAs are starting to also offer free ACME based certificates as well.
While the first version of the ACME protocol only supported the creation of single domain certificates, ACME v2 supports the creation and signing of certificates with wildcard domains, such as *.example.com, allowing you to use a single certificate across all of your subdomains. Note that ACME only facilitates domain validation. If you need certificates that require additional validation, you may need acquire signed certificates from an established CA that offers services beyond ACME.

If you need to quickly create and issue certificates across your infrastructure, for the purpose of using TLS/SSL protected services, consider using a CA that supports ACME and using an ACME client. ACME can automatically generate your key pairs and CSR, submit your CSR to a CA for validation, perform any validation steps for the CA and obtain the signed certificate and store it somewhere that is accessible to services and applications. Many clients automatically set periodic cron tasks to regularly check for certificate expiry and to automatically request a new certificate before the current certificate expires.
Chapter 2 Using OpenSSL in Oracle Linux

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This chapter describes the OpenSSL tools that are available in Oracle Linux and how to use them to create Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs), self-signed certificates, and your own CA certificates. Also covered in this chapter are instructions on how to use the OpenSSL tools to validate and test certificates that are configured for a protocol to confirm that your services are configured correctly.

The `openssl` command, which is included in the `openssl` package, enables you to perform a wide range of cryptography functions from the OpenSSL library, including the following:

- Create and managing pairs of private and public keys.
- Perform public key cryptographic operations.
- Create self-signed certificates.
- Create certificate signing requests (CSRs).
- Create certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
- Convert certificate files between various formats.
- Calculate message digests.
- Encrypt and decrypt files.
- Test client-side and server-side TLS/SSL with HTTP and SMTP servers.
- Verify, encrypt, and sign S/MIME email.
- Generate and test prime numbers and generate pseudo-random data.

2.1 Creating Key Pairs

The first step to using any form of public key cryptography is to create a public/private key pair. You can then use the private key to create a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) that contains the associated a public key. The CSR can be used to obtain a signed certificate from a CA. Typically, the steps to create a key pair and a CSR or a self-signed certificate, are performed as a single-step operation when using OpenSSL to generate these files.

In the following instructions and example, the creation of a key pair is treated as an atomic operation so that the process can be properly described and elements can be called out for better understanding. Usually, this step is incorporated into other commands for efficiency.
The following are the main elements that you need to consider when creating a key pair:

- **Algorithm.** OpenSSL facilitates the use of RSA and ECDSA key algorithms, with RSA keys being the most widely used. Note that DSA keys can be created but these should not be used unless specifically required. ECDSA is a modern variant that facilitates much smaller and efficient key sizes than both RSA or DSA, along with equivalent security. ECDSA may be a good choice for performance, but you should be aware that some environments may not recognize ECDSA keys.

- **Key Size.** The key size determines the complexity of the key for the algorithm, which is specified in bits. Higher sized keys are more secure because they are more complex and harder to decipher. Higher sized keys also come with a performance hit, because each bit of decryption requires more memory and processing to complete. Therefore, selecting a key size is a balance between security and performance. Key sizes are complex, in that they relate to the algorithms and ciphers that are being used. In general, when creating RSA keys, your key size should be 2048 bits, while ECDSA keys provide similar security using a key size of 256 bits.

- **Passphrase.** When creating a key that is encrypted and protected with a cipher, you are prompted for a passphrase that can be used to validate that you are permitted to use the key. Encrypting a key with a passphrase is optional, but it is recommended. Using a passphrase with a key can be problematic when TLS is enabled for a system service, as the service cannot be automatically restarted without user intervention. Frequently, where certificates are issued for services; for convenience, they are created without passphrases. If a private key is created without a passphrase, you should be aware that anyone who gains access to the private key file is able to emulate your services to perform man-in-the-middle type snooping. When a key is protected with a passphrase, you can select a cipher algorithm to use to encrypt the contents of the private key. There are many ciphers available for this purpose. To obtain a complete list of ciphers, use the `openssl list-cipher-commands` command. The AES cipher is commonly used for this purpose and is usually specified with a key size of 128 or 256 (aes128 or aes256).

To generate an RSA key, use the `openssl genrsa` command, for example:

```
$ openssl genrsa -out private.key 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
...................................................
....................................................
...................................................++++
................................+++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
```

This command generates an unencrypted key in the local directory, named `private.key`. The contents of the key look similar to the following example:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEogIBAAKCAQEkXtaX3OmCyfcQEc9D8WZCcS2WzyzVRLsAbSGbwHOf
gOA4vU37fBH5+PoHw5065sTGKXLt2/yZyf993UrbnCHSN+ehdf2E5FMN1uhp4F
Zj4R9Q3md51caYg?+JEa8+DCnZr+e9dv/xxieKemLguYd/DrTnkuuorGHyX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HdT3RnihsF5/seoXweCM4NNwaj/LenBjkr+x55wmyBxwbbkznDygFJUDECy1EayMyPf
wD1asPUEzra3B75Fz3B2PbyVvY2jA2hjoudX25VayEP/kbhsJ1k0ACqCQ9Qvd
dAE4yu6sHvPQ176/8QcM/fsTqNGbAbmLE/a+HFX5jyPYEQn0tsTl/8WrQNDw+or0w
RhUJ/9n92j3GBAr5r480Y9Mo/g7Ur/mYhJD80CgYBIIoLeMdxm/8R2TBL0C+2
```

To generate an unencrypted private key, use the `openssl genrsa` command:

```
$ openssl genrsa -out private.key 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
...................................................
....................................................
...................................................++++
................................+++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
```

To obtain a complete list of ciphers, use the `openssl list-cipher-commands` command.
Creating Key Pairs

Note that even though the file is called `private.key` and the file contains some text that suggests that this is only the private key, the public key is embedded within this file as well. So the single file represents the complete key pair. OpenSSL does this so that it is easy to always get a copy of the public key from the same file where the private key is stored.

To create an encrypted key with a passphrase, run the same command but specify a cipher to use to encrypt the key with, for example:

```
$ openssl genrsa -aes256 -out private.key 2048
```

In the previous example, the AES cipher is used with a 256 bit key. The command prompts you to enter a passphrase and verify it. The contents of the key file indicate that the key is encrypted, as shown in the following example:

```
$ cat private.key
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,241A82FF6A4ABF97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O41oliPqAsleWk4BdWDBr/Pos3YyLmJre1DCXKvh1a/MLAZa2iBxqX61+bA0
SrpcrIonWulf/tpx5YMwolox86CaPueW011qExymld2d1s85E1W1C2GEFPo1Q
03eXU1kuxu1rzhAPuvP3ndaq6Rg1UF1d1zeAeFTj15e3c7hjxKXupondJN3aD23
40P3pkz/FZ/2Z00F77y7p819271y8B1Cxd+x1M11QMuS2T+x59XhNae4jybl11L2aH5BG
hdSGunA519NnDyTvWLxwnxajeLMMrY3CFgeAs17P27831iwVGCMxClF1D0xYyn1
ypB6NAMERd9A40Xu3M57lswMVH1zewIEDE9F+p/1/t/9dEdwxKfeze439XUTsueq0Ejr
C8/bk3AnKfKXWk9o6bemrTm51Hl1rtpdsJsgjquTqgqy6SuizMsDrSz6r8/2id40LCFqy2qY8
PyFQ20sxwcbFmb8+10ebKHMNdQmnhDcvRgvcYvYyyA4CPBq4+Hu3FhejvLz9tvv
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

If you create an encrypted key file and then decide that you would prefer a file that is not encrypted or does not require a passphrase, you can decrypt it by running the following command:

```
$ openssl rsa -in private.key -out private_no_passphrase.key -d
```

If you create an encrypted key file and then decide that you would prefer a file that is not encrypted or does not require a passphrase, you can decrypt it by running the following command:
You are prompted for the pass phrase on the encrypted key, which is stored in `private.key`, and the unencrypted version of the same key is written to the file `unencrypted.key`.

All OpenSSL keys are generated in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format, which is a plain text format that encapsulates the content of the key as a base64 encoded string. Certificates can be encoded by using several different formatting conventions. For more information about changing the format of a certificate, see Changing Key or Certificate Format.

You can view the contents of a private key as follows:

```
$ openssl rsa -text -in private.key
```

Notably, a private key also contains its public key counterpart. This public key component is used when submitting a CSR or when creating a self-signed certificate. The public key component can be viewed by using the following command:

```
$ openssl rsa -pubout -in private.key
```

### 2.2 Creating Certificate Signing Requests With OpenSSL

A private key can be used to create a Certificate Signing Request (CSR). While a public and private key can be used to encrypt communications, it is important that a client be able to validate that the public certificate presented for use with encrypted communication is from the source that it really expects. Without some way to validate the public key, the client can easily succumb to man-in-the-middle style attacks that would render encryption futile.

To solve this problem, public key infrastructure typically involves third parties, called Certification Authorities (CAs), that can sign a certificate as authentic for a particular public key. If the client has a copy of the CA certificate, the client is able to validate a certificate for a domain, based on the signature in the certificate. Most systems are installed with some trusted CA certificates by default. To check the CA certificates that are trusted by your system, use the following command:

```
# openssl version -d
```

By default, this directory is `/etc/pki/tls` and the `/etc/pki/tls/certs` subdirectory contains all of the trusted certificates.

To obtain a signed certificate from a CA, a CSR must be generated using the public key component within its associated private key. The CSR is then presented to the CA who can validate the information in the request and use this information to generate a valid and signed public certificate. The CSR is associated with a domain name for the host or hosts on which the certificate will be used. The CA uses this information to create a certificate with a specified expiry date.

The following example shows the command syntax for interactively creating a CSR from a private key:

```
$ openssl req -new -key private.key -out domain.example.com.csr
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]:GB
State or Province Name (full name) []:
Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]:London
```
Signing Certificates With OpenSSL

Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]: Example Ltd
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []: 
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []: domain.example.com
Email Address []: webmaster@example.com

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:
An optional company name []:

Note that the default values can be configured in the /etc/pki/tls/openssl.cnf file. The most important value in your CSR is the Common Name. This value associates the certificate request with the hostname and domain name for the host on which the certificate is to be used. Note that if a client connects to a host that is issued a certificate for a different domain, the certificate is invalid.

It is possible to generate a CSR and private key at the same time. The following command also allows you to specify values for the different fields in the CSR on the command line:

```
openssl req -new -nodes '/CN=domain.example.com/O=Example Ltd/C=GB/L=London' \
-newkey rsa:1024 -keyout private.key -out domain.example.com.csr
```

You can view the information contained in a CSR as follows:

```
openssl req -in domain.example.com.csr -noout -text
```

After you have a CSR, you can submit it to a CA and it is then used to generate your signed certificate, which is usually returned along with a certificate chain that can be used to validate your certificate.

2.3 Signing Certificates With OpenSSL

For environments where you do not have control over client systems, you should always use a recognized, independent CA to sign your certificates. Operating system and software vendors negotiate with independent CAs to include CA validation certificates, along with the software that they distribute. Obtaining validation certificates from major CA providers means that most users do not have to manage their own trusted CA certificate list. Any browser visiting a website over HTTPS can validate the site's public certificate by matching the CA signature to the CA certificates that it has in its own store.

If you have control over client systems, you can either provide the clients with the self-signed certificate, directly; or, you can set up your own CA certificate to sign all of the certificates that are used within your organization and then distribute the CA certificate to your clients. Using the second approach validates all subsequent certificates that are signed within your organization, resulting in tighter control over the security of the certificates within your organization, which can result in lower infrastructure costs.

2.3.1 Creating Self-Signed Certificates for Testing and Development

Self-signed certificates are frequently created for development and testing purposes. Since they cannot be revoked if the private key is compromised, you should never use these certificates in production environments. A CA-signed certificate is always preferable to a self-signed certificate. However, using self-signed certificates can be less costly and useful for testing and development, without the hassle of managing your own CA or obtaining CA-signed certificates for every test platform.

The `openssl` command enables you to generate self-signed certificates that can be used immediately. This command essentially creates a CSR for the private key and then generates an X.509 certificate directly from the CSR, signing the certificate with itself.

For this reason, the command is similar to the command that you would run to create a private key and CSR, with the exception that you must also specify the period of validity. It is good practice to only generate a self-signed certificate for as long as you are likely to need it for testing purposes. This way, if
the private key is compromised, the validity period is limited, and a new certificate can be generated when
the old certificate expires.

For example, you would use the following command to create a self-signed X.509 certificate that is valid
for 30 days (substituting the certificate subject values with values that you require for your host and domain
name):

```
# openssl req -new -x509 -days 30 -nodes -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout private.key \
-out public.cert -subj '/C=US/ST=Ca/L=Sunnydale/CN=www.example.com'
```

where the generated `private.key` file contains the private key and the `public.cert` file contains the
self-signed certificate. It is common practice to name these files with the same value as the Common
Name so that you can keep track of which certificates and keys apply to which host and domain name.

Note that you can set the `-newkey` value to suit your own algorithm and key size requirements. In this
example, the algorithm is set to RSA and the key size is set at 2048 bits.

You can copy the self-signed certificate file to the trusted certificate store for any client system and the
client system will usually validate the certificate as a match whenever it makes a connection to the host
that serves it.

You can also use the `keytool` command to generate self-signed certificates, but this command's primary
purpose is to install and manage JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) digital certificates for use with
Java applications. See Chapter 3, Using the keytool Command for more information.

### 2.3.2 Creating a Private Certification Authority

By creating your own private Certification Authority (CA), you can process CSRs for all of the certificates
within your organization. You are also capable of managing your own Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
which client systems can use to determine whether a certificate is still valid or if it has been revoked.

This approach is better than using self-signed certificates because you can control revocation. However,
your CA certificate must still be distributed to all of the client systems that need to validate public
certificates within your organization.

#### 2.3.2.1 Create the CA Root

The CA Root is the fundamental certificate for a CA and is not usually used to sign server or client
certificates. The CA Root is usually used to sign one or more intermediary certificates to grant them power
to sign other certificates. This model means that if a CA Intermediary private key is compromised, the CA
Intermediary can be added to a certificate revocation list and all of the certificates that are signed by the
Intermediary are automatically invalidated.

This model helps to protect the integrity of the entire public key infrastructure. Without a CA Root, there is
no public key infrastructure, as the CA Root is used to create the chain of trust that is used to validate all
certificates in the hierarchy. The CA Root should generally be created and maintained on a system that is
completely isolated, ideally with minimal or no network access and no direct access to the Internet. The
security measures that are implemented around the CA Root are critical to the security of the entire public
key infrastructure. If the CA Root private key is compromised, every certificate that is ever signed by the
entire chain may be compromised as well.

To create a CA Root for your organization, you must create a root key pair according to a defined
configuration that OpenSSL can use to manage the CA configuration and the database of metadata for
certificates that it issues.

There are several steps that you need to take to create the CA Root, which are described in the following
procedures and examples.
Create a CA Directory Structure

All of the certificates and metadata that are managed by the CA Root are stored in a specific directory structure and within some preconfigured files. You should create the structure according to your own requirements, but follow these general steps:

1. Create a directory to store all of the CA-related data:

   ```
   # mkdir /root/ca
   ```

   You can store this directory anywhere on the system. However, keep in mind that it contains very sensitive data, so ensure that it is located somewhere with very restricted access.

2. Change to the CA directory to perform all of the subsequent steps in this procedure:

   ```
   # cd /root/ca
   ```

3. Create directories to contain the following for your system: CA certificates, CA database content, Certificate Revocation List, all newly issued certificates, and your private keys:

   ```
   # mkdir certs db crl newcerts private
   ```

4. Protect your private keys to ensure that access to the directory where these are stored is limited to the current user:

   ```
   # chmod 700 private
   ```

5. Create the files that will be used for your CA database:

   ```
   # touch db/index.txt
   # openssl rand -hex 16 > db/serial
   # echo 1001 > db/crlnumber
   ```

Create a CA Root Configuration File

The CA Root configuration should be created and stored in the directory where all of the CA related content is stored. For example, you would create a file in `/root/ca/ca-root.conf` and populate it with the following content:

```ini
[default]
name = root-ca
domain_suffix = example.com
aia_url = http://$name.$domain_suffix/$name.crt
crl_url = http://$name.$domain_suffix/$name.crl
ocsp_url = http://ocsp.$name.$domain_suffix:9080
default_ca = ca_default
name_opt = utf8,escape_ctrl,multiline,lname,align

[ca_dn]
countryName = "AU"
organizationName = "Example Org"
commonName = "Root CA"

[ca_default]
home = .
database = $home/db/index.txt
serial = $home/db/serial
crlnumber = $home/db/crlnumber
certificate = $home/$name.crt
private_key = $home/private/$name.key
RANDFILE = $home/private/random
new_certs_dir = $home/certs
unique_subject = no
copy_extensions = none
```
default_days = 3650
default_crl_days = 30
default_md = sha256
policy = policy_strict

[policy_strict]
# The root CA should only sign intermediary certificates that match.
# See the POLICY FORMAT section of `man ca`.
countryName = match
stateOrProvinceName = optional
organizationName = match
organizationalUnitName = optional
commonName = supplied
emailAddress = optional

[policy_loose]
# Allow the intermediary CA to sign a more diverse range of certificates.
# See the POLICY FORMAT section of the `ca` man page.
countryName = optional
stateOrProvinceName = optional
localityName = optional
organizationName = optional
organizationalUnitName = optional
commonName = supplied
emailAddress = optional

[req]
# Standard Req options
default_bits = 4096
encrypt_key = yes
default_md = sha256
utf8 = yes
string_mask = utf8only
prompt = no
distinguished_name = ca_dn
req_extensions = ca_ext

[ca_ext]
# Extensions for a the CA root (`man x509v3_config`).
basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
keyUsage = critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash

[interi mediate_ext]
# Extensions for an intermediary CA.
s ubjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer
basicConstraints = critical, CA:true, pathlen:0
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, cRLSign, keyCertSign

[server_ext]
# Extensions for server certificates.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
nsCertType = server
nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Server Certificate"
s ubjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer:always
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth

[client_ext]
# Extensions for client certificates.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
nsCertType = client, email
nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Client Certificate"
s ubjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer
The previous example shows a configuration that contains many optional entries that can help when performing different operations with OpenSSL. Most importantly, the configuration defines the extensions that can be applied to different certificate types to validate the types of operations the are valid for the certificate. This configuration also defines different policies that can be applied when signing certificates. For instance, you can use a strict policy to ensure that a particular metadata is specified; and, that it matches the CA values within a CSR, if the certificate is to be signed. This policy is important for generating intermediary CA certificates. A less restrictive policy can be applied for other certificates that are signed, either by the CA Root or any intermediary.

The following are descriptions of the various sections within this configuration file:

- **[default]**. The default section defines some basic configuration information such as URLs where information such as the root certificate and the published revocation list for this CA might be published. Note that the `name` and `domain_suffix` entries here are used as variables to help construct some of these URLs and are also used to name and reference key files and certificates. You may wish to use the system hostname and the system domain for these values. This configuration entry also references the location of the default CA configuration entry at `ca_default`.

- **[ca_dn]**. This section defines some default values for certificates that are generated for this CA's distinguished name. These values are written into the CSR and the self-signed certificate that is generated from it for the CA Root certificate.

- **[ca_default]**. This section provides the configuration that controls the entire CA. This information provided maps the directories that were created for this CA to the configuration so that OpenSSL can correctly update files and store certificates and keys in the correct places. This section also defines some default values such as how many days a certificate is valid for and how many days the certificate revocation list is valid. Because this configuration is for a root CA, the number of days that the certificate is valid for can be set to 10 years, since a change to the root CA would mean that all of subsequent certificates in the infrastructure would also need to be re-issued. You can view all of the configuration file options in the `CA(1)` manual pages.

- **[policy_strict]**. This section describes a strict policy that should be followed when signing some certificates, such as the intermediary CA certificates. The policy defines rules around the metadata within the certificate. For instance, there are rules that the country name and organizational name match the CA certificate. Other fields are optional, but a common name must be supplied.

- **[policy_loose]**. This section is used for other certificates that are signed by this CA and its intermediaries, where a less restrictive policy is allowed. This policy entry allows the majority of fields to be optional and only requires that the common name is supplied.

- **[req]**. This section is used one time to create the CA certificate request and defines the default options to use when the certificate request is generated, for example, a key length of 4096 bits for the root CA. There is also an option that points to the CA distinguished name that references the `ca_dn` section of this configuration file for obtaining the default values to use within the certificate request.
• **[ca_ext]**. This extensions section defines those operations for which a certificate is valid. For the root CA, this certificate must be valid in order to sign all of the intermediary CA certificates and essentially has full rights. For more information about extensions, see the \texttt{X509V3_CONFIG(5)} manpage.

• **[intermediary_ext]**. This section is separate extension configuration for certificates that are signed as intermediary CAs. This certificate has the same rights as the root CA, but is unable to sign certificates for further intermediary CAs, controlled with the \texttt{pathlen:0} within the certificate's \texttt{basicConstraints} option.

• **[server_ext]**. This section includes typical extension options for server-side certificates, which are usually used for services like HTTPS and server-side mail services, and so on. These certificates are issued for validation and encryption purposes; they do not have signing rights. The configuration entry can be referenced when signing a certificate for this purpose.

• **[client_ext]**. This section includes client-side certificates, which are often used for remote authentication, where a user may provide a certificate to validate and authenticate access to a system. These certificates also have specific extensions that control usage. This configuration entry can be used when signing a certificate for client side certificates to ensure that the correct extensions are applied to the certificate.

• **[crl_ext]**. This extension is automatically applied when creating a CRL, but this extension is provided for completeness. See Section 2.3.2.4, “Manage a Certificate Revocation List”

• **[ocsp]**. The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is an alternative approach to CRLs. An OCSP server can be set up to handle requests by client software to obtain the status of a certificate from a resource that is referenced in a signed certificate. Special extensions exist for this purpose. The \texttt{OCSP(1)} manual page can provide more information. See also Section 2.3.2.5, “Configure and Run an OCSP Server”.

### Create and Verify the CA Root Key Pair

Create a private key and a certificate signing request for the CA root using the configuration values that you have specified in the \texttt{ca-root.conf} file and save the private key to \texttt{private/root-ca.key}. Since this is the most valuable key in your entire infrastructure, ensure that you use a lengthy and suitable passphrase to protect it.

```bash
# openssl req -new -config ca-root.conf -out root-ca.csr -keyout private/root-ca.key
```

Now, create a self-signed certificate by using the CSR and the \texttt{ca-root.conf} file. Take care to specify that the certificate must use the extensions defined in the \texttt{ca_ext} portion of the configuration.

```bash
# openssl ca -selfsign -config ca-root.conf -in root-ca.csr -out root-ca.crt -extensions ca_ext
```

Using configuration from ca-root.conf
Enter pass phrase for ./private/root-ca.key:
Check that the request matches the signature
Signature ok
Certificate Details:
Certificate:
   Data:
      Version: 3 (0x2)
      Issuer: countryName = AU
       organizationName = Example Org
       commonName = Root CA
      Validity
       Not After : Oct 26 12:23:04 2029 GMT
      Subject:
Creating a Private Certification Authority

countryName               = AU
organizationName          = Example Org
commonName                = Root CA
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
  RSA Public-Key: (4096 bit)
    Modulus:
    0f:ab:3e:38:7c:e7:c7:5e:34:e2:40:d0:fd:f2:
    e4:5e:2c:8a:e8:11:83:de:6b:4c:45:c8:8c:4b:9c:
    0a:52:84:9f:26:63:34:41:ff:e0:9a:ea:a8:ec:d6:ff:
    54:63:7c:10:0a:82:2f:84:3f:56:28:cf:8a:03:76:
    c4:ac:cb:9b:1b:cc:cc:2a:2a:db:6f:de:6e:8e:7b:02:
    ac:86:2f:6b:0:80:ea:7:30:5c:14:c8:12:1e:66:
    aa:6a:5e:54:50:5e:ad:cf:4e:ce:71:93:b1:0c:0f:
    c9:91:43:93
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
    CA:TRUE
  X509v3 Key Usage: critical
    Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
Certificate is to be certified until Oct 26 12:23:04 2029 GMT (3650 days)
Sign the certificate? [y/n]: y

1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]: y
Write out database with 1 new entries
Data Base Updated

You are prompted for your private key passphrase to continue. After being shown the values of the certificate, you are prompted to sign the certificate. After signing the certificate, you can commit it to your CA database. The database files are updated to track this certificate within your public key infrastructure.

You can view the db/index.txt file to see the CA root certificate entry:

```bash
# cat db/index.txt
V 291026122304Z 8F75111A8E13B2D109A00B0F079C67C83E unknown /C=AU/O=Example Org/CN=Root CA
```
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The values that are displayed on each line within the database index include:

1. **Status** (V for valid, R for revoked, E for expired).
2. Expiry date in **YYMMDDHHMMSSZ** format.
3. Revocation date or empty if not revoked (in this example output, the field is empty).
4. Hexadecimal serial number.
5. File location or **unknown**, if not known.
6. Distinguished name.

### 2.3.2.2 Create an intermediary CA

The next step in creating your infrastructure is to create an intermediary CA that can process all of your server and client certificates. This is important because if the intermediary CA private key is compromised, the root CA can revoke its certificate and invalidate any other certificate that has been issued by that intermediary.

The intermediary CA should ideally be hosted on an alternate server with wider access as it will be used to handle the majority of your certificate requests. The intermediary CA is an exact model of the root CA, with the exception that its own certificate is signed by the root CA and is configured with the appropriate extensions to process signing requests.

#### Create a CA directory structure

On the intermediary CA host, perform the same operations that you performed to create the root CA directory structure, but name the parent directory appropriately so that it is clear that the configuration is for an intermediary, for example:

```bash
# mkdir /root/ca-intermediary
# cd /root/ca-intermediary/
# mkdir certs db crl newcerts private
# chmod 700 private
# touch db/index.txt
# openssl rand -hex 16 > db/serial
# echo 1001 > db/crlnumber
```

#### Create the intermediary CA Configuration

The intermediary CA configuration is almost identical to the configuration that you created for the CA root, with a few modifications that make it specific to the intermediary. Modifications are indicated in **bold** text in the following example:

```
[default]
name                    = sub-ca
domain_suffix           = example.com
aia_url                 = http://$name.$domain_suffix/$name.crt
crl_url                 = http://$name.$domain_suffix/$name.crl
crl_url                 = http://ocsp.$name.$domain_suffix:9080
default_ca              = ca_default
name_opt                = utf8,esc_ctrl,multiline,lname,align

[ca_dn]
countryName             = "AU"
organizationName        = "Example Org"
commonName              = "Intermediary CA"

[ca_default]
home                    = .
database                = $home/db/index.txt
```
serial = $home/db/serial
crlnumber = $home/db/crlnumber
certificate = $home/$name.crt
private_key = $home/private/$name.key
RANDFILE = $home/private/random
new_certs_dir = $home/certs
unique_subject = no
copy_extensions = none
default_days = 3650
default_crl_days = 30
default_md = sha256
policy = policy_strict

[policy_strict]
# The root CA should only sign intermediary certificates that match.
# See the POLICY FORMAT section of `man ca`.
countryName = match
stateOrProvinceName = optional
organizationName = match
organizationalUnitName = optional
commonName = supplied
emailAddress = optional

[policy_loose]
# Allow the intermediary CA to sign a more diverse range of certificates.
# See the POLICY FORMAT section of the `ca` man page.
countryName = optional
stateOrProvinceName = optional
localityName = optional
organizationName = optional
organizationalUnitName = optional
commonName = supplied
emailAddress = optional

[req]
# Standard Req options
default_bits = 4096
encrypt_key = yes
default_md = sha256
utf8 = yes
string_mask = utf8only
prompt = no
distinguished_name = ca_dn
req_extensions = intermediary_ext

[ca_ext]
# Extensions for a the CA root (`man x509v3_config`).
basicConstraints = critical,CA:true
keyUsage = critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash

[intermediary_ext]
# Extensions for an intermediary CA.
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
# authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer
basicConstraints = critical, CA:true, pathlen:0
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, cRLSign, keyCertSign

[server_ext]
# Extensions for server certificates.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
nsCertType = server
nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Server Certificate"
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer:always
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage = serverAuth
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```plaintext
[client_ext]
# Extensions for client certificates.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
nsCertType = client, email
nsComment = "OpenSSL Generated Client Certificate"
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer
keyUsage = critical, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature, keyEncipherment
extendedKeyUsage = clientAuth, emailProtection

[crl_ext]
# Extension for CRLs.
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always

[ocsp]
# Extension for OCSP signing certificates.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier = hash
authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid,issuer
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature
extendedKeyUsage = critical, OCSPSigning
```

Note that in the `intermediary_ext` section, a line has been commented out because the intermediary will not issue any further intermediary certificates. The intermediary is unaware of the certificate issuer until the certificate is signed. If you attempt to create the CSR while this line is still included in the configuration, it fails because it cannot determine which certificate issuer to include this metadata in the CSR.

Save the configuration file as `intermediary.conf`.

Create a CSR for the intermediary CA

Create a CSR for the intermediary certificate:

```plaintext
# openssl req -new -config intermediary.conf -out sub-ca.csr -keyout private/sub-ca.key
```

This certificate is also a signing certificate, so it is important to protect it with a passphrase to help prevent its unauthorized use and maintain the security of your infrastructure. Enter the passphrase when prompted.

Create a signed certificate for the intermediary CA

Copy the `sub-ca.csr` that you generated in the previous step to the `/root/ca` directory on the system where your root CA is hosted. On the root CA host, run the following commands to generate a signed certificate from the CSR and apply the intermediary signing extension:

```plaintext
# cd /root/ca
# openssl ca -config ca-root.conf -in sub-ca.csr -out newcerts/sub-ca.crt \
-extensions intermediary_ext
```

You are prompted for the root CA passphrase, then presented with the certificate content and prompted to sign it. Check that the certificate contents make sense before you sign it. You can see that the certificate is issued by the Root CA and contains the Intermediary CA in the Subject. You can also see that the correct extensions are applied to the certificate.

After the certificate is signed, you are prompted to update the database.

The newly signed certificate is created as `newcerts/sub-ca.crt`.

Create a certificate chain file

Because no systems are aware of the root CA certificate, you should create a certificate chain that includes the public certificate for the root CA with the newly created intermediary CA certificate. In this way, hosts
only need a copy of the chained certificate to validate any certificates that are issued by the intermediary CA. To create the certificate chain, simply join the two public certificates by running the following command on the root CA host:

```
# cat root-ca.crt newcerts/sub-ca.crt > newcerts/chained-sub-ca.crt
# chmod 444 newcerts/chained-sub-ca.crt
```

Copy the `newcerts/sub-ca.crt` and `newcerts/chained-sub-ca.crt` certificate back to the `/root/ca-intermediary/` directory on the intermediary CA host. You can now use this certificate to process server and client CSRs and to generate CRLs.

When you return a signed certificate for any given CSR, include the `chained-sub-ca.crt` certificate so that it can be installed on the host where the certificate will be used and distributed to any client that needs to validate the signed certificate.

### 2.3.2.3 Process CSRs and Sign Certificates

As systems generate CSRs using the process that is described in Section 2.2, “Creating Certificate Signing Requests With OpenSSL”, they must submit them to a CA to be signed.

All subsequent CSR processing for server and client-side certificates should be performed by an intermediary CA that is configured within your environment or by an external third party CA.

To process a CSR, copy it to the `/root/ca-intermediary` directory on your intermediary CA host and then use the `openssl ca` command to sign it with the appropriate extension configuration.

For example, to sign a server-side certificate for a CSR named `www.example.com.csr`, run the following command:

```
# openssl ca -config intermediary.conf -extensions server_ext -days 375 -in www.example.com.csr -out newcerts/www.example.com.crt
```

Note that we specify the number of days for which the certificate is valid. For a server-side certificate, the number of days should be limited to a value significantly lower than a CA certificate’s validity. It is important to select the correct extensions to apply to the certificate. These extensions map to definitions that are within your configuration file.

You are prompted for the intermediary CA key passphrase and then prompted to sign the certificate and update the database.

You should return the certificate, along with the chained CA certificate, so that these can be distributed to validate the certificate.

### 2.3.2.4 Manage a Certificate Revocation List

The certificate revocation list is used to identify certificates that have been issued by a signing CA and revoked. The list also tracks the reason that a certificate was revoked.

#### Generate the CRL

On each CA host, you should create an empty CRL that can be updated as you need to revoke certificates. For example, on an intermediary CA, you would use the following command:

```
# cd /root/ca-intermediary
# openssl ca -config intermediary.conf -gencrl -out crl/sub-ca.crl
```

Note that the CRL should be published to the URL that is defined in your configuration file to keep track of certificates that are revoked by the CA. You should configure a web service to serve the `sub-ca.crl`, if possible.
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You can check the contents of a CRL as follows:

```bash
# openssl crl -in crl/sub-ca.crl -noout -text
```

If the CRL was just created, it is empty. A new CRL should be created periodically, based on the configuration value that is set in the CA configuration file for `default_crl_days`. By default, it is set for every 30 days.

### Revoke a certificate

Every signed certificate contains the serial number that is issued by the signing CA. You can view this serial number within a certificate as follows:

```bash
# openssl x509 -serial -noout -in server.crt
```

This serial number identifies the certificate within the CA signing database and can also be used to identify the certificate stored by the CA that signed it so that the CA can revoke it.

On the CA where the certificate was issued, you can find the certificate with the matching serial number in the `certs` directory. For example, on an intermediary host, for a certificate with serial number `8F75111A8E33B2D109A8BF079C67C83F`, it would be as follows:

```bash
# cd /root/ca-intermediary
# ls certs/8F75111A8E33B2D109A8BF079C67C83F* 
certs/8F75111A8E33B2D109A8BF079C67C83F.pem
```

You can also check the details for the certificate in the CA database:

```bash
# grep 8F75111A8E33B2D109A8BF079C67C83F db/index.txt
```

To revoke this certificate, the signing CA must issue the following command:

```bash
# openssl ca -config intermediary.conf -revoke certs/8F75111A8E33B2D109A8BF079C67C83F.pem 
-crl_reason keyCompromise
```

Note that you should specify the reason for revoking the certificate, as this reason is used in the certificate revocation list. Options include the following: unspecified, keyCompromise, CACompromise, affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold, and removeFromCRL. For more information, see the CA(1) manual page.

When a certificate is revoked, the CA database is updated to reflect this change and the status is set to `R` for the certificate that is listed in the `db/index.txt` file.

The database file is used to generate the CRL each time it is created. It is good practice generating a new CRL as soon as you revoke a certificate. In this way, this list is kept up to date. See Generate the CRL for more information.

### 2.3.2.5 Configure and Run an OCSP Server

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) provides an alternative to CRLs and includes its own publishing mechanism. OpenSSL includes an option to run as an OCSP server that can respond to OCSP queries.

Note that OCSP is preferred over CRLs. Usually, it is a good idea to make sure that an OCSP server is running for your CA, particularly if the OCSP URL appears in your configuration, as this URL is included in each certificate that is signed by the CA. Any client software can confirm the revocation status of a certificate by querying the OCSP server.
For any CA, create a key and CSR for the OCSP server:

```bash
# openssl req -new -newkey rsa:2048 -subj "/C=AU/O=Example Org/CN=OCSP Responder" \
-keyout private/ocsp.key -out ocsp.csr
```

Create a signed certificate from the `ocsp.csr` CSR file:

```bash
# openssl ca -config intermediary.conf -extensions ocsp -days 187 -in ocsp.csr \ 
-out newcerts/ocsp.crt
```

Because the OCSP certificate is responsible for handling revocation, it cannot be revoked. Therefore, it is a good practice to set the validity period on the certificate to a manageable, but relatively short period. In this example, the validity period has been set to 187 days, which means that it needs to be refreshed every 6 months.

To run an OCSP server on the current CA, you can use the tool provided within OpenSSL. For example, you could use the following command:

```bash
# openssl ocsp -port 9080 -index db/index.txt -rsigner newcerts/ocsp.crt \ 
-rkey private/ocsp.key -CA sub-ca.crt -text
```

Note that the command specifies the CA `db/index.txt` file directly, which means that as certificates are revoked, the OCSP server becomes aware of them automatically. When you run the command, you are prompted for the OCSP key passphrase. The server continues to run until you kill the process or escape by using a control sequence such as `Ctrl-C`.

You can test the service by checking the `ocsp.crt` file. Use the `openssl` command as follow to run an OCSP query:

```bash
# openssl ocsp -issuer sub-ca.crt -CAfile chained-sub-ca.crt -cert newcerts/ocsp.crt \ 
-url http://127.0.0.1:9080
```

Response verify OK
newcerts/ocsp.crt: good
This Update: Oct 30 15:48:11 2019 GMT

The response in the previous example indicates whether the verification has succeeded and provides a status of `good` if the certificate has not been revoked. A status of `revoked` is returned if it has been revoked.

### 2.4 Debugging and Testing Certificates With OpenSSL

The following are some examples that show how you can use OpenSSL commands to work with existing certificates to debug and test your infrastructure. The examples provided here are not comprehensive and are intended to supplement the existing OpenSSL manual pages.

#### Examining Certificates

Display the information contained in an X.509 certificate.

```bash
# openssl x509 -text -noout -in server.crt
```

Display the SHA1 fingerprint of a certificate.

```bash
# openssl x509 -sh1 -noout -fingerprint -in server.crt
```

Display the serial number of a signed certificate:

```bash
# openssl x509 -serial -noout -in server.crt
```
Check That a Private Key Matches a Certificate

The modulus and the public exponent parts of the key and the certificate must match. These values are usually long and difficult to check. The easiest way to compare the modulus in the key and certificate is to create an MD5 hash of each and compare those instead, for example:

```
# openssl x509 -noout -modulus -in server.crt | openssl md5
# openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in server.key | openssl md5
```

You can equally check the modulus in a CSR to see if it matches a key or certificate as follows:

```
# openssl req -noout -modulus -in server.csr | openssl md5
```

Changing Key or Certificate Format

Convert a root certificate to a form that can be published on a web site for downloading by a browser:

```
# openssl x509 -in cert.pem -out rootcert.crt
```

Convert a base64 encoded certificate (also referred to as PEM or RFC 1421) to binary DER format:

```
# openssl x509 -in cert.pem -outform der -out certificate.der
```

Convert the base64 encoded certificates for an entity and its CA to a single PKCS7 format certificate:

```
# openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile entCert.cer -certfile CACert.cer -out certificate.p7b
```

Check Certificate Consistency and Validity

Verify a certificate including the signing authority, signing chain, and period of validity:

```
# openssl verify cert.pem
```

Decrypting Keys and Adding or Removing Passphrases

If you create an encrypted key file, and then decide that you would prefer a file that is not encrypted or that does not require a passphrase, you can decrypt it by using the following command:

```
$ openssl rsa -in private.key -out unencrypted.key
```

Enter pass phrase for private.key:

writing RSA key

You are prompted for the passphrase on the encrypted key, which is stored in `private.key`, and the unencrypted version of the same key is written to the `unencrypted.key` file.

If you want to encrypt an unencrypted key and add a passphrase to protect it, run the following command:

```
$ openssl rsa -aes256 -in unencrypted.key -out private.key
```

In the previous example, the AES cipher is used with a 256 bit key. The command prompts you to enter a passphrase and to verify it. The new encrypted key file is written to `private.key`.

You can add or remove a passphrase from the private key at any time without affecting its public key counterpart. Adding a passphrase protects the private key from use by an unauthorized or malicious user, but comes with an added inconvenience, in that services that use the private key always require manual intervention to start or restart. If you remove the passphrase from a key, make sure that it is stored with strict permissions and that it is not copied to systems that do not require it.
Using OpenSSL to Test SSL/TLS Configured Services

Test a self-signed certificate by launching a server that listens on port 443:

```
openssl s_server -accept 443 -cert cert.pem -key prikey.pem -www
```

Test the client side of a connection. This command returns information about the connection including the certificate and allows you to directly input HTTP commands:

```
openssl s_client -connect server:443 -CAfile cert.pem
```

Extract a certificate from a server as follows:

```
echo | openssl s_client -connect server:443 2>/dev/null | \n  sed -ne '/BEGIN CERT/,/END CERT/p' > svrcert.pem
```

2.5 Using OpenSSL for File Encryption and Validation

You can use OpenSSL for much more than the implementation of TLS on network-based communications. Other uses of OpenSSL include the encryption and decryption of any file type, as well as the ability to create digests that can be signed and used to validate the contents and the origin of a file. The following are some additional examples of how you might use the `openssl` command.

Encrypt a file by using Blowfish:

```
openssl enc -blowfish -salt -in file -out file.enc
```

Decrypt a Blowfish-encrypted file:

```
openssl enc -d -blowfish -in file.enc -out file.dec
```

Create an SHA1 digest of a file:

```
openssl dgst -sha1 file
```

Sign the SHA1 digest of a file using the private key stored in the file `prikey.pem`:

```
openssl dgst -sha1 -sign prikey.pem -out file.sha1 file
```

Verify the signed digest for a file using the public key stored in the file `pubkey.pem`:

```
openssl dgst -sha1 -verify pubkey.pem -signature file.sha1 file
```

2.6 More information About OpenSSL

For more information about OpenSSL, see the `openssl(1)`, `ciphers(1)`, `dgst(1)`, `enc(1)`, `req(1)`, `s_client(1)`, `s_server(1)`, `s_client(1)`, `verify(1)`, and `x509(1)` manual pages.
Chapter 3 Using the keytool Command

Most Java applications use the keystore that is supplied with JDK to store cryptographic keys, X.509 certificate chain information, and trusted certificates. The default JDK keystore in Oracle Linux is the /etc/pki/java/cacerts file. You can use the keytool command to generate self-signed certificates and install and manage certificates in the keystore. Note that the keytool command syntax has changed in Java SE 6. The examples that are provided in this chapter apply to this version of the keytool command.

The following examples show how you might use the keytool command.

List the contents of the keystore, /etc/pki/java/cacerts:

```bash
# keytool -list [-v] -keystore /etc/pki/java/cacerts
```

The default keystore password is changeit. If specified, the verbose option -v displays detailed information.

Change the password for a keystore, for example, /etc/pki/java/cacerts:

```bash
# keytool -storepasswd -keystore /etc/pki/java/cacerts
```

The following example shows how you would create a new keystore (keystore.jks) to manage your public/private key pairs and certificates from entities that you trust, generate a public/private key pair by using the RSA algorithm and a key length of 1024 bits, and then create a self-signed certificate that includes the public key and the specified distinguished name information:

```bash
# keytool -genkeypair -alias mycert -keyalg RSA -keysize 1024
   -dname "CN=www.unserdom.com, OU=Eng, O=Unser Dom Corp, C=US, ST=Ca, L=Sunnydale"
   -alias engineering -keypass pkpassword -keystore keystore.jks
   -storepass storepassword -validity 100
```

where pkpassword is the private key password and storepassword is the keystore password. In this example, the certificate is valid for 100 days and is associated with the private key in a keystore entry that has the alias engineering.

Print the contents of a certificate file in a human-readable form:

```bash
# keytool -printcert [-v] -file cert.cer
```

If specified, the verbose option -v displays detailed information.

Generate a CSR in the file carequest.csr for submission to a CA:

```bash
# keytool -certreq -file carequest.csr
```

The CA signs and returns a certificate or a certificate chain that authenticates your public key.

Import the root certificate or certificate chain for the CA from the ACME.cer file into the keystore.jks keystore and assign it the alias acmeca:

```bash
# keytool -importcert -alias acmeca [-trustcacerts] -file ACME.cer
   -keystore keystore.jks -storepass storepassword
```

If specified, the -trustcacerts option instructs keytool to add the certificate only if it can validate the chain of trust against the existing root CA certificates in the cacerts keystore. Alternatively, you can use the keytool -printcert command to check that the certificate's fingerprint matches the fingerprint that the CA publishes.
Import the signed certificate for your organization after you have received it from the CA:  

```
# keytool -importcert -v -trustcacerts -alias acmeca -file ACMEdom.cer \
   -keystore keystore.jks -storepass storepassword
```

In this example, the file containing the certificate is `ACMEdom.cer`. The `-alias` option specifies the entry for the first entity in the CA's root certificate chain. The signed certificate is added to the front of the chain and becomes the entity that is addressed by the alias name.

Delete the certificate with the alias `aliasname` from the `keystore.jks` keystore:  

```
# keytool -delete -alias aliasname -keystore keystore.jks -storepass storepassword
```

Export the certificate with the alias `aliasname` as a binary PKCS7 format file, which includes the supporting certificate chain as well as the issued certificate:  

```
# keytool -exportcert -noprompt -alias aliasname -file output.p7b \
   -keystore keystore.jks -storepass storepassword
```

Export the certificate with the alias `aliasname` as a base64 encoded text file (also referred to as PEM or RFC 1421):  

```
# keytool -exportcert -noprompt -rfc -alias aliasname -file output.pem \
   -keystore keystore.jks -storepass storepassword
```

For a certificate chain, the file includes only the first certificate in the chain, which authenticates the public key of the aliased entity.

For more information, see the `keytool(1)` manual page.