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Oracle VM Server for SPARC 3.1 Security Guide
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Using This Documentation

Chapter 1 Oracle VM Server for SPARC Security Overview

Security Features Used by Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Oracle VM Server for SPARC Product Overview

Applying General Security Principles to Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Security in a Virtualized Environment

Execution Environment

Securing the Execution Environment

Defending Against Attacks

Operational Environment

Threat: Unintentional Misconfiguration

Countermeasure: Creating Operational Guidelines

Threat: Errors in the Architecture of the Virtual Environment

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Guests to Hardware Platforms

Countermeasure: Planning an Oracle VM Server for SPARC Domain Migration

Countermeasure: Correctly Configuring Virtual Connections

Countermeasure: Using VLAN Tagging

Countermeasure: Using Virtual Security Appliances

Threat: Side Effects of Sharing Resources

Evaluation: Side Effects Through Shared Resources

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Hardware Resources

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Shared Resources

Summary: Side Effects Through Shared Resources

Execution Environment

Threat: Manipulation of the Execution Environment

Evaluation: Manipulation of the Execution Environment

Countermeasure: Securing Interactive Access Paths

Countermeasure: Minimizing the Oracle Solaris OS

Countermeasure: Hardening the Oracle Solaris OS

Countermeasure: Using Role Separation and Application Isolation

Countermeasure: Configuring a Dedicated Management Network

ILOM

Threat: Complete System Denial-of-Service

Evaluation: Complete System Denial-of-Service

Countermeasure: Securing the ILOM

Hypervisor

Threat: Breaking the Isolation

Evaluation: Breaking the Isolation

Countermeasure: Validating Firmware and Software Signatures

Countermeasure: Validating Kernel Modules

Control Domain

Threat: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

Evaluation: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

Countermeasure: Securing Console Access

Logical Domains Manager

Threat: Unauthorized Use of Configuration Utilities

Evaluation: Unauthorized Use of Configuration Utilities

Countermeasure: Applying the Two-Person Rule

Countermeasure: Using Rights for the Logical Domains Manager

Countermeasure: Hardening the Logical Domains Manager

Countermeasure: Auditing the Logical Domains Manager

Service Domain

Threat: Manipulation of a Service Domain

Evaluation: Manipulation of a Service Domain

Countermeasure: Granularly Segregating Service Domains

Countermeasure: Isolating Service Domains and Guest Domains

Countermeasure: Restricting Access to Virtual Consoles

I/O Domain

Threat: Experiencing a Denial-of-Service of an I/O Domain or a Service Domain

Evaluation: Experiencing a Denial-of-Service of an I/O Domain or a Service Domain

Countermeasure: Granularly Configuring I/O Domains

Countermeasure: Configuring Redundant Hardware and Root Domains

Threat: Manipulation of an I/O Domain

Evaluation: Manipulation in an I/O Domain

Countermeasure: Protecting Virtual Disks

Guest Domains

Countermeasure: Securing the Guest Domain OS

Chapter 2 Secure Installation and Configuration of Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Chapter 3 Security Considerations for Developers

Appendix A Secure Deployment Checklist

Service Domain

A service domain provides some virtual services to guest domains on the system. Services might include a virtual switch, virtual disk, or virtual console service.

Figure 1–6 shows an example service domain that offers console services. Often the control domain hosts the console services, and thus is also a service domain. The execution environment domains often combine the functions of a control domain, I/O domain, and service domain in one or two domains.

Threat: Manipulation of a Service Domain

An attacker who gains control of a service domain can manipulate data or listen to any communication that occurs through the offered services. This control might include console access to guest domains, access to network services, or access to disk services.

Evaluation: Manipulation of a Service Domain

While the attack strategies are the same as for an attack on the control domain, the possible damage is less because the attacker cannot modify the system configuration. The resulting damage might include the theft or manipulation of data that is being offered by the service domain but not manipulation of any data sources. Depending on the service, an attacker might be required to exchange kernel modules.

Figure 6 - Service Domain Example

image:Graphic shows how the control domain communicates with the service domain and that you can communicate with a guest by means of a virtual console.
Countermeasure: Granularly Segregating Service Domains

If possible, have each service domain offer only one service to its clients. This configuration guarantees that only one service can be compromised if a service domain is breached. However, be sure to weigh the importance of this type of configuration against the additional complexity. Note that having redundant I/O domains is highly recommended.

Countermeasure: Isolating Service Domains and Guest Domains
Countermeasure: Restricting Access to Virtual Consoles

Ensure that access to individual virtual consoles is limited to only those users that must access them. This configuration ensures that no single administrator has access to all consoles, which prevents access to consoles other than those assigned to a compromised account. See How to Create Default Services in Oracle VM Server for SPARC 3.1 Administration Guide .