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Oracle VM Server for SPARC 3.1 Security Guide
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Using This Documentation

Chapter 1 Oracle VM Server for SPARC Security Overview

Security Features Used by Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Oracle VM Server for SPARC Product Overview

Applying General Security Principles to Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Security in a Virtualized Environment

Execution Environment

Securing the Execution Environment

Defending Against Attacks

Operational Environment

Threat: Unintentional Misconfiguration

Countermeasure: Creating Operational Guidelines

Threat: Errors in the Architecture of the Virtual Environment

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Guests to Hardware Platforms

Countermeasure: Planning an Oracle VM Server for SPARC Domain Migration

Countermeasure: Correctly Configuring Virtual Connections

Countermeasure: Using VLAN Tagging

Countermeasure: Using Virtual Security Appliances

Threat: Side Effects of Sharing Resources

Evaluation: Side Effects Through Shared Resources

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Hardware Resources

Countermeasure: Carefully Assigning Shared Resources

Summary: Side Effects Through Shared Resources

Execution Environment

Threat: Manipulation of the Execution Environment

Evaluation: Manipulation of the Execution Environment

Countermeasure: Securing Interactive Access Paths

Countermeasure: Minimizing the Oracle Solaris OS

Countermeasure: Hardening the Oracle Solaris OS

Countermeasure: Using Role Separation and Application Isolation

Countermeasure: Configuring a Dedicated Management Network

ILOM

Threat: Complete System Denial-of-Service

Evaluation: Complete System Denial-of-Service

Countermeasure: Securing the ILOM

Hypervisor

Threat: Breaking the Isolation

Evaluation: Breaking the Isolation

Countermeasure: Validating Firmware and Software Signatures

Countermeasure: Validating Kernel Modules

Control Domain

Threat: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

Evaluation: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

Countermeasure: Securing Console Access

Logical Domains Manager

Threat: Unauthorized Use of Configuration Utilities

Evaluation: Unauthorized Use of Configuration Utilities

Countermeasure: Applying the Two-Person Rule

Countermeasure: Using Rights for the Logical Domains Manager

Countermeasure: Hardening the Logical Domains Manager

Countermeasure: Auditing the Logical Domains Manager

Service Domain

Threat: Manipulation of a Service Domain

Evaluation: Manipulation of a Service Domain

Countermeasure: Granularly Segregating Service Domains

Countermeasure: Isolating Service Domains and Guest Domains

Countermeasure: Restricting Access to Virtual Consoles

I/O Domain

Threat: Experiencing a Denial-of-Service of an I/O Domain or a Service Domain

Evaluation: Experiencing a Denial-of-Service of an I/O Domain or a Service Domain

Countermeasure: Granularly Configuring I/O Domains

Countermeasure: Configuring Redundant Hardware and Root Domains

Threat: Manipulation of an I/O Domain

Evaluation: Manipulation in an I/O Domain

Countermeasure: Protecting Virtual Disks

Guest Domains

Countermeasure: Securing the Guest Domain OS

Chapter 2 Secure Installation and Configuration of Oracle VM Server for SPARC

Chapter 3 Security Considerations for Developers

Appendix A Secure Deployment Checklist

Control Domain

The control domain, which often has the roles of an I/O domain and a service domain, must be kept safe as it can modify the configuration of the hypervisor, which controls all attached hardware resources.

Threat: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

The shutdown of the control domain can result in a denial of service of the configuration tools. Because the control domain is required only for configuration changes, the guest domains are unaffected if they access their network and disk resources through other service domains.

Evaluation: Control Domain Denial-of-Service

Attacking the control domain over the network is equivalent to attacking any other properly protected Oracle Solaris OS instance. The damage of a shutdown or similar denial of service of the control domain is relatively low. However, guest domains are affected if the control domain also acts as a service domain for these guest domains.

Countermeasure: Securing Console Access

Avoid configuring administrative network access to the execution environment's domains. This scenario requires that you use the ILOM console service to the control domain to perform all administration tasks. Console access to all other domains is still possible by using the vntsd service running on the control domain.

Consider this option carefully. Although this option reduces the risk of being attacked over the administrative network, only one administrator can access the console at a time.

For information about securely configuring vntsd, see How to Enable the Virtual Network Terminal Server Daemon in Oracle VM Server for SPARC 3.1 Administration Guide .